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Abstract
This paper studies the relationship between investor protection, …nancial risk shar-
ing and income inequality. In the presence of market frictions, better protection makes
investors more willing to take on entrepreneurial risk while lending to …rms. This im-
plies lower cost of external …nance and better risk sharing between …nanciers and
entrepreneurs. Investor protection, by boosting the market for risk sharing plays the
twofold role of encouraging agents to undertake risky enterprises and providing them
with insurance. By increasing the number of risky projects, it raises income inequal-
ity. By extending insurance to more agents, it reduces it. As a result, the relationship
between the size of the market for risk sharing and income inequality is hump-shaped.
Empirical evidence from a cross-section of sixty-eight countries, and a panel of …fty
countries over the period 1976-2000, supports the predictions of the model.
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1 Introduction
A recent literature on law and …nance has shown that investor protection plays a signi…cant
role in shaping the …nancial structure of an economy, by a¤ecting the relative weights of
equity and debt in external …nance (see Acemoglu and Johnson, 2003 and La Porta et al.,
1997 and 2006, among others). In particular, it is argued that measures aimed at improv-
ing transparency and disclosure of information to the shareholders, and the enforcement
of their rights, reduce the costs of outside-…nance (see, for instance, Shleifer and Wolfen-
zon, 2002) and allow a better allocation of risk between …nanciers and entrepreneurs (see
Castro et al., 2004). Several works have recognized the importance of …nancial develop-
ment for enhancing macroeconomic performance, mainly as measured by GDP growth and
productivity (see, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2001 for a survey). However, this growing
literature has not recognized that the changes in the risk-taking behavior of investors and
…rms, associated with better shareholder protection, may also a¤ect income inequality.
This paper investigates the link between investor protection, risk sharing and income
inequality, both theoretically and empirically. It proposes a simple model where investor
protection promotes risk sharing between …nanciers and entrepreneurs, thereby inducing
more risk taking in the economy. Better insurance on individual earnings and wider risk
taking, in turn, a¤ect income inequality in opposite ways. The relationships predicted by
the model are then confronted with the data.
To formalize these ideas, I construct a general equilibrium two-period overlapping
generations model where agents are risk averse and heterogeneous in their entrepreneurial
ability. When young, agents face a choice between a safe and a risky technology, and
entrepreneurial ability a¤ects the probability of success in the risky project. Starting up
a …rm requires an initial investment, so that entrepreneurs may have to borrow capital.
Financial contracts are designed to be optimal and incentive compatible, and may make
risk sharing between investors and entrepreneurs possible to a certain degree. Financial
markets are subject to imperfections arising from the non-observability of output to …-
nanciers, but measures of investor protection can be adopted to amend these frictions.
In particular, by promoting transparency, investor protection makes it costly for entre-
preneurs to misreport their cash ‡ow.1 For instance, this cost can be thought of as the
extra-compensation an advisory …rm charges to certify a falsi…ed book or to design …nan-
cial operations to hide revenues from outside …nanciers. Better guarantees generate more
con…dence among investors, thereby making them more willing to bear risk and insure the
1 Also in Aghion et al. (2005), Castro et al. (2004) and Lacker and Weinberg (1989) does investor
protection take the form of a hiding cost. In this paper, like in the two latter, the cost is proportional to
the hidden amount, while in the …rst, it equals a fraction of the initial investment.
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entrepreneurs through lending. In turn, investors can spread the individual risk by holding
diversi…ed portfolios of risky activities. As a result, …nancial systems with stronger in-
vestor protection provide entrepreneurs with higher degrees of risk sharing. Finally, I rule
out wealth heterogeneity, so that all inequality is due to idiosyncratic factors (ability),
…nancial market conditions and income risk. Under these assumptions, better investor
protection a¤ects income inequality in three ways. (i) It improves risk sharing, thereby
reducing income volatility for a given mass of agents operating the risky technology; (ii) it
raises the share of the population choosing the risky option, and therefore being exposed
to earning risk; and (iii) it increases the reward to ability. (i) tends to reduce inequality,
while (ii) and (iii) raise it.
The main result of the paper is that income inequality is a hump-shaped function
of investor protection and of the size of the market for …nancial instruments that allow
risk sharing (brie‡y, the market for risk sharing). Any improvement upon a low level of
investor protection increases risk taking more than risk sharing, thereby driving inequality
up. However, when investor protection is su¢ciently high - and the market for risk sharing
is big enough - any further improvement a¤ects more risk sharing than risk taking, hence
reduces income inequality.
This theoretical result is derived in terms of the size of the market for risk sharing,
which cannot be measured directly. It can be argued, though, that entrepreneurs bear
more risk the more leveraged they are, and thus the market for risk sharing is bigger, the
higher the weight of equity relative to debt in the capital structure. Therefore, to evaluate
empirically the predictions of the model, I proxy the size of the market for risk sharing
with the ratio of stock market capitalization over total credit to the private sector. In
particular, I provide evidence from a cross-section of sixty-eight countries and a panel of
…fty countries, spanning from 1976 to 2000, that: (1) there is a hump-shaped relationship
between income inequality and the ratio of stock market capitalization over total credit
to the private sector; and (2) the latter grows with investor protection.
The contribution of this paper is related to three main strands of literature. Acemoglu
and Johnson (2003), as well as La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 1999, 2006), show that investor
protection, and in general institutions aimed at contracting protection a¤ect the …nancial
structure of an economy by promoting the development of stock markets, but have unclear
e¤ects on economic performance. None of these studies has considered income inequality.
Many papers (see Levine, 2005 for a survey) provide empirical evidence on the link
between …nancial development and macroeconomic performance in terms of GDP growth,
investments and productivity.2 It is also shown that whether …nancial markets are more
2 All these works account for the in‡uence of the legal environment on …nancial structure. In particular,
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stock- or debt-based does not seem to matter for macroeconomic performance, but no
attention was paid to the e¤ects of …nancial structure on income distribution.
Theoretical contributions by Aghion and Bolton (1997), Banerjee and Newman (1993),
Galor and Zeira (1993), Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), and Piketty (1997), among
others, have proposed explanations for the relationship between …nancial development,
inequality and growth. In most of these models, income inequality originates from het-
erogeneity in the initial wealth distribution, paired with credit market frictions. As the
poorest are subject to credit constraints, they are prevented from making e¢cient invest-
ments in the most productive activities.3 Over time, capital accumulation determines the
dynamics of wealth and income. I depart from this approach in two main respects. First,
I shift the focus from …nancial development, broadly de…ned as the overall availability of
external …nance to the private sector, to the development of the market for instruments
that allow agents not only to raise external …nance but also to share risks at the same time.
Second, I consider a di¤erent source of ex-ante heterogeneity (entrepreneurial ability), and
propose a new mechanism translating di¤erences in ability into income inequality that is
independent of wealth accumulation. In the present paper, heterogeneity in productivity,
the extent of risk sharing and the size of the risky sector ultimately determine the income
distribution.
There are, to my knowledge, only two empirical assessments of the relationship between
…nancial development and income inequality (Clarke et al., 2006 and Beck et al., 2006).
As the theoretical works above, these papers are interested in the e¤ects of overall external
…nance availability on income inequality, and both …nd evidence of a negative relationship.
My contribution focuses explicitly on the impact of a particular form of external, risk-
sharing, …nance on income inequality. Therefore, instead of taking a general measure of
…nancial depth as a regressor for income inequality, I use the size of the stock market
relative to total credit to the private sector, that seems well suited to account for the
degree of risk sharing allowed by a …nancial system. Not only are my empirical results
consistent with the previous evidence on the negative e¤ect of …nancial depth on income
inequality, but they also provide a novel contribution by emphasizing the opposite role of
equity-like …nance in raising inequality.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and its
solution in partial equilibrium (a small open economy). In section 3, I study analytically
and by means of numerical solution how income inequality varies with investor protection
…nancial variables are instrumented with legal origins, which Acemoglu and Johnson (2003) and La Porta
et al. (1997, 1998, 1999, 2006) used as instruments for contracting protection.
3 The credit constraint can derive from the non-observability of physical output as in Banerjee and
Newman (1992) and Galor and Zeira (1993), or e¤ort as in Aghion and Bolton (1997) and Piketty (1997).
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and the size of the market for risk sharing. I show in the appendix that the main results
hold in general equilibrium (a closed economy). Section 4 shows that empirical evidence
from a cross-section of sixty-eight countries and a panel of …fty countries over the period
1976-2000 supports the main results of the model. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Set up
The model economy is populated by two-period overlapping generations of risk-averse
agents. There is no population growth and the measure of each cohort is normalized to
one. For simplicity, preferences are represented by the following utility function:
Ut = log(ct) + ¯ log (ct+1) :
Second-period utility is discounted at the rate ¯ 2 (0; 1) :
 p i ,r t+1  
{Safe,Risky}  
borrow   w it 
{s it,c it} 
c i t + 1=  (1+rt + 1)s i t 
Young Old  
die  y it inves t s it 
Figure 1: Timing of the model
At any time t, each young agent in ability group i is born with no wealth and ability
¼i 2 [0; 1], drawn from distribution G(¼). Each group has a density g(¼) of individuals.
In the …rst period, agents work as self-employed entrepreneurs producing an intermediate
good, and allocate their income among consumption and savings, s(¢). When old, they
invest their savings and consume all the returns before dying. When investing, they can
choose between safe loans, yielding a return rt+1, and portfolios of risky assets. There are
no bequests.
2.1.1 Intermediate goods sector
Two production processes are available to each young agent: a safe and a risky one. Both
technologies require a …xed unit investment. In line with empirical …ndings, I assume that
the risky activity, if successful, has higher returns than the safe one and that the probability
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of success depends on the ability of the entrepreneur.4 For simplicity, and without much
loss of generality, I assume that ability only a¤ects the probability of success and not the
payo¤s.5 In particular, production is given by:
xit =
8><>:
B for i running Safe technology
A with prob. ¼i
'A with prob. 1 ¡¼i
)
for i running Risky technology,
where B < A, ' 2 (0; 1) and success is i.i.d. within each group. It follows that there is no
aggregate risk and total production of group i equals g (¼i)B or g (¼i) [¼i+ (1¡ ¼i)'A],
depending on the technology, safe or risky, in use.6
2.1.2 Final good sector
A homogeneous …nal good Y , used for consumption and investment, is produced by com-
petitive …rms using capital and intermediate goods. The intermediate goods produced by
all types of agents are perfect substitutes in production. The aggregate technology has
the following Cobb-Douglas form:
Yt = K®Y tX
1¡®
t ; (1)
where Xt is the total amount of intermediate goods, with a unit price of Ât, KY t is the
amount of capital employed in the …nal good sector and ® 2 (0; 1) is its share of production.
Yt is the numeraire.
2.1.3 Financial sector
Firms in both the …nal and the intermediate good sectors need to borrow capital from the
old in order to produce. Information about technology (A, B, ', ®), individual ability
(¼i), and technological choice is public, but outside …nanciers cannot observe the outcome
of risky activities, xit.
The …nancial contract is modeled as follows. Upon receiving capital, each …rm commits
to pay, after production, shares µht and µlt of its cash ‡ow in case of success and failure,
4 See Schiller and Crewson (1997), and Fairly and Robb (2003) for empirical studies on the determinants
of entrepreneurial success, mainly among small …rms.
5 Ability can be considered as playing a twofold role. It enhances the chance of succeeding in risky
enterprises, as assumed in the model. But it may also raise productivity regardless of the riskiness of
projects. Introducing this second e¤ect into the model would not a¤ect the results.
6 For studies on the relationship between inequality, risk sharing and asset prices in presence of aggregate
risk, see among others Constantinides and Du¢e (1996) and Storesletten et al. (2006).
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respectively. Final good producers and young entrepreneurs using the safe technology
are not subject to any risk, nor information asymmetry, so that they will repay a …xed
amount for each unit of capital, corresponding to the safe interest rate, rt. The repayment
schedule facing young risky entrepreneurs is di¤erent. Once production has occurred,
unlucky entrepreneurs of type i can only return the promised amount µlitxlitÂt. Successful
entrepreneurs, instead, may misreport their realization of xit and pay µlitxlitÂt, pretending
to be in the bad state. However, I assume that measures of investor protection make
misreporting costly. For every unit of hidden cash ‡ow, the entrepreneur incurs a cost
p 2 [0;1]. Since both ability and technology are common knowledge, either the entire
amount
¡
xhit ¡xlit
¢
or nothing is hidden, so that the payo¤ from misreporting is
¡
xhit ¡
µlit xlit
¢
Ât¡ p
¡
xhit ¡ xlit
¢
Ât. Truth-telling is rational as long as its value is at least equal to
that of misreporting. Therefore, the …nancial contract
©
µhit; µlit
ª
must satisfy the incentive
compatibility (IC) constraint:
v
h³
1 ¡ µhit
´
xhitÂt; rt+1
i
¸ v
h³
xhit ¡ µlitxlit
´
Ât ¡ p
³
xhit ¡ xlit
´
Ât; rt+1
i
; (IC)
where v [wt; rt+1] is the indirect utility of a young agent with a given income wt and facing
an interest rate rt+1 when old.
Financial contracts are set to maximize the agents’ expected indirect utility, Vit, subject
to the IC constraint and the outsiders’ participation constraint. The latter requires that
old agents be indi¤erent between lending to all …rms of group-i, and lending to safe …rms.
Thus, the payo¤s from the risky technology are determined as the solution to the optimal
…nancial contract problem:
max
µhit;µ
j
it
Vit ´
n
¼iv
h³
1 ¡ µhit
´
AÂt; rt+1
i
+(1 ¡¼i) v
h³
1 ¡ µlit
´
'AÂt; rt+1
io
; (P1)
subject to the incentive compatibility constraint:
v
h³
1 ¡ µhit
´
AÂt; rt+1
i
¸ v
h³
1 ¡ 'µlit
´
AÂt ¡ p (1 ¡')AÂt; rt+1
i
; (IC’)
and the old’s participation constraint:
¼iµhitAÂt +(1 ¡ ¼i) µlit'AÂt = rt: (PC)
Note that a pooled portfolio of loans to the i.i.d. …rms of group i yields the LHS of (PC)
with certainty, so that the old face no uncertainty.7
7 It follows that the participation constraint is the same as in the case of risk-neutral …nanciers with a
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2.1.4 Equilibrium
Firms in the …nal good sector are perfectly competitive and maximize pro…ts taking prices
(rt;Ât) as given. Each young agent from group i has perfect foresight and chooses how
much to save, s (¢), and the technology to use (safe or risky), to maximize her expected
utility. Thus, each of them solves the following program:
max
T2fSafe;RiskygV
T
it ; (P2)
where
V Safeit = v (BÂt ¡ rt; rt+1)
V Riskyit = ¼iv
h³
1 ¡ µhit
´
AÂt; rt+1
i
+ (1 ¡¼i)v
h³
1 ¡ µlit
´
'AÂt; rt+1
i
v (wit; rt+1) = log [wit ¡ s (wit; rt+1)] + ¯ log [(1 + rt+1) s (wit; rt+1)]
s (wit; rt+1) = arg max
sit
flog (wit ¡ sit) +¯ log [(1 + rt+1) sit]g :
Here, wit is realized income, i.e., BÂt ¡ rt in case the safe technology is chosen, otherwise¡
1 ¡ µhit
¢
AÂt and
¡
1 ¡ µlit
¢
'AÂt in the good and bad state respectively. In other words,
young entrepreneurs choose technology, given their individual ability ¼i, factor prices rt
and Ât, and the optimal …nancial contract fµlit; µhitg which solves (P1).
To state the mechanism of the model in the clearest way, I …rst assume this to be a
small open economy.8 Both capital and intermediate goods are internationally traded, so
that rt and Ât are exogenously given from the world markets, while the …nal good Y is
non traded.9 Assuming that prices (r, Â and p) are constant, the economy is always in
a steady-state and I can drop all the time indexes. It follows that aggregate domestic
demand for the …nal good is Y D = (1+ r)
R 1
0 s (¼) g (¼)d (¼)+
R 1
0 w (¼) g (¼)d (¼).
De…nition Given the interest rate r, the intermediate good price Â, and the misre-
porting cost p, the equilibrium for this small open economy is de…ned as the set of savings,
technological choices and …nancial contracts fsi; Ti; µli; µhi
ª
i2[0;1], such that each agent in
group i solves (P1) -(P2); and the factor employments fKY ; Xg that maximize pro…ts
in the …nal good sector.
For simplicity, I assume that 'A < rÂ < B < A. This implies that both safe and
single type-i borrower.
8 In the appendix, I endogenize the interest rate and the price of the intermediate good, and show that
the main results continue to hold.
9 This assumption is immaterial, since factor prices are equalized everywhere.
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risky intermediate projects are run in equilibrium; and when investor protection is absent,
nobody chooses the risky technology.10
2.2 Solution
2.2.1 Final good sector
Pro…t maximization by competitive …rms in the …nal good sector yields the following
demand functions for capital and intermediates: KY = ®Yr and X = (1¡ ®)YÂ . Market
clearing requires Y = Y D.
2.2.2 Young agents
Due to log-utility, the optimal saving function of each young agent is simply a constant
fraction (1 +¯)¡1 of her earnings. To solve for the optimal occupational choice (P 2), an
agent born in group i needs to know the payo¤s from the risky technology. Therefore, I
proceed backwards. First, I derive the optimal …nancial contracts
©
µhi ; µ
l
i
ª
i2[0;1] from (P1),
under both perfect and imperfect investor protection. Then, I characterize the occupa-
tional choice, fTigi2[0;1], given the optimal payo¤s. Finally, I show how the equilibrium is
a¤ected by investor protection.
Optimal …nancial contract: e¢cient markets, p = 1
In this case, the payo¤ from hiding cash ‡ow equals earnings in the bad state,
¡
1 ¡ µli
¢
Âxli.
This means that there is no incentive for entrepreneurs to misreport, so that investors can
act as if they had perfect information about xi. Having a state-invariant income is the
…rst best for risk-averse entrepreneurs. Since outside …nanciers behave as if they were risk-
neutral and perfectly informed, they are willing to provide insiders with full insurance,
given that the expected return equals the safe rate. Analytically, the …rst-order conditions
for (P1) subject to (PC) require:
v0h = v0l and³
1 ¡ µhi
´
= [¼i +(1 ¡¼i)'] ¡ rAÂ;
where v0h and v0l are the derivatives of v
£¡
1 ¡ µhi
¢
AÂ;r
¤
and v
£¡
1 ¡ µli
¢
'AÂ;r
¤
with re-
spect to µhi and µli; respectively. This means that (IC0) holds with equality and
¡
1 ¡ µhi
¢
AÂ =¡
1 ¡ µli
¢
'AÂ (i.e., earnings of entrepreneurs are state invariant: whi = wli).
10 This assumption also rules out risky debt. However, it can be shown that removing this restriction
would not have any considerable e¤ect on the results.
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Optimal …nancial contract: general case, 0 < p < 1
If investor protection is not perfect, state invariant earnings are not incentive compatible:
entrepreneurs in the good state would be tempted to misreport xi and enjoy the higher
utility given by earnings
¡
1 ¡ 'µlit
¢
AÂ¡ p (1 ¡ ')AÂ. Investors are aware of this and
hence account for it when determining the repayments. In other words, both (IC 0) and
(PC) must hold with equality, so that
wli =
³
1 ¡ µli
´
'AÂ = f[¼i +(1 ¡ ¼i)'] ¡¼i (1 ¡ p) (1 ¡')g AÂ ¡ r;
whi =
³
1 ¡ µhi
´
AÂ =
³
1 ¡ µli
´
'AÂ + (1 ¡ p) (1 ¡')AÂ:
The wedge between state-contingent earnings, i.e. the price for the temptation to misre-
port, is decreasing in investor protection. If the cost of hiding pro…ts is high, temptation to
misreport is low, as is its price in terms of distance from the …rst best. The ratio between
payo¤s and ability is lower than in the e¢cient case, and increasing in p. This means
that, by discouraging misbehavior, investor protection also fosters meritocracy. Expected
earnings for entrepreneurs are the same as under perfect investor protection, but expected
utility is lower, due to risk aversion. Notice that for p = 0, the optimal …nancial contract
implies state independent repayments, which leave the entire risk on the entrepreneur.
Technological choice
The solution to (P 2) features a threshold ability level ¼¤ such that the Risky technology
is chosen by any agent with ability higher than ¼¤. This property is formalized in Lemma
1.
Lemma 1 There exists a unique ¼¤ such that 8¼i ¸ ¼¤; ¼iv[(1¡ µhi )AÂ; r]+ (1¡ ¼i)v [(1¡
µli)'AÂ;r] ¸ BÂ ¡ r; and
©
µhi ; µ
l
i
ª
is the solution to (P 1) :
Proof. See the Appendix.
2.2.3 Investor protection and the equilibrium
Since the dividend payouts
©
µhi ; µli
ª
are functions of investor protection, also the threshold
ability ¼¤ varies with p, as formalized in Lemma 2
Lemma 2 The threshold ability ¼¤ is a decreasing, convex function of investor protection
p.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Notice that the risky technology is chosen only when some degree of risk sharing is
attainable through the …nancial contract. Thus, the measure of agents who become risky
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entrepreneurs represents the size of the market for risk sharing. Safe …rms instead get
started and operated regardless of the borrowing conditions in the …nancial market. From
Lemmas 1 and 2, it follows that the size of the market for risk sharing is a function of
investor protection, as stated by Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 The size of the market for risk sharing, M ´ 1 ¡ G (¼¤), is increasing in
investor protection, and concave for high p.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Corollary 1 De…ne the size of the overall external …nance as F ´ KY + 1. The size
of the market for risk sharing as a ratio of the total external …nance, MF is increasing in
investor protection and concave for high p.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In the e¢cient case (p = 1), the value of producing with the risky technology is higher
than that of running the safe project whenever [¼i +(1 ¡ ¼i)']A ¸ B. Therefore, I can
easily get a closed form solution for the threshold ability,
¼¤p=1 =
B ¡ A'
(1 ¡')A;
and verify that it lies in the support of ¼ under the hypotheses that A > B and 'A < B.
In the general case of imperfect investor protection (p < 1), the expression for the
threshold ability is more complicated. However, payo¤s are easily derived:
w (¼i) =
8><>:
BÂ ¡ r with probability 1 for ¼i < ¼¤
whi with probability ¼i for ¼i ¸ ¼¤
wli with probability 1 ¡¼i for ¼i ¸ ¼¤
whi = [¼ip (1 ¡') +' + (1 ¡ p) (1 ¡')]AÂ ¡ r (2)
wli = [¼ip (1 ¡') +']AÂ ¡ r: (3)
Henceforth, I denote the threshold abilities associated with p = 1 and 0 < p < 1 by ¼¤p=1
and ¼¤p<1, respectively. For p = 1, perfect risk sharing is achieved through the optimal
…nancial contract, so that entrepreneurs act as if they were risk-neutral. They choose
the risky technology as soon as their ability implies expected earnings equal to the safe
ones, i.e. ¼i = ¼¤p=1. This means that their earnings are state invariant and exhibit no
discontinuity at the threshold ability level. When 0 < p < 1, at ¼i = ¼¤p<1 the expected
productivity of the risky technology needs to be higher than the productivity of the safe
technology, because entrepreneurs are risk averse and cannot be fully insured by investors.
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Bc -r
p*p<1
w
pi1
whip<1
wlip<1
p(1-j) A
wip=1
(1-j) A
Ac-r
p*p=1
Figure 2: Model solution: ability-earnings pro…les.
Figure 2 illustrates the optimal ability-earnings pro…les. If there is no investor protec-
tion, nobody chooses the risky technology and hence earnings are ‡at and equal to BÂ-r.
In the opposite extreme case of p = 1, income of young agents is described by the solid
line. It is ‡at for the less able, who run the safe project, and proportional to ability for
the more talented, risky entrepreneurs. Due to perfect risk sharing, earnings are state
invariant. If investor protection drops to 0 < p < 1 (dashed line), …nancing a risky …rm
becomes more costly, thereby inducing the least able among risky entrepreneurs to shift to
the safe sector. Graphically, (1) the market for risk sharing shrinks, i.e., the ‡at portion of
the earnings pro…le becomes longer. I de…ne this as the “market size” e¤ect. (2) Propor-
tionality between stochastic payo¤s and ability becomes weaker due to higher incentives
to misreport, and the wedge between state contingent earnings widens due to worse risk
sharing. I call this, as illustrated by the ‡atter slope and higher distance between whip<1
and wlip<1, the “insurance” e¤ect. The extent of imperfect insurance is captured by the
jump in expected earnings at ¼¤p<1. At any ¼i ¸ ¼¤p<1; the expected payo¤ from the risky
technology is independent of p since, for a given interest rate, the old are indi¤erent be-
tween borrowers. However, even though expected earnings are invariant, welfare is higher
under perfect investor protection because of risk aversion.
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3 Evaluating income inequality
In this section, I derive the key implications of the model on the overall e¤ect of investor
protection on income inequality, through the development of the market for risk sharing.
To do so, I compute the variance of earnings,
V ar (w) = G (¼¤) [BÂ ¡ r ¡ E (w)]2 +
Z 1
¼¤
½
¼
h
wh (¼) ¡E (w)
i2
+(1 ¡¼)
h
wl (¼) ¡ E (w)
i2¾
g (¼)d¼;
with E (w) = G (¼¤)BÂ+ AÂ
R 1
¼¤[¼+ (1¡ ¼)']g (¼)d¼¡ r, and study how it varies with
p.11
If there is no investor protection, all agents choose the safe technology and thus, the
variance is zero. If the cost of hiding cash ‡ow becomes any higher than zero (p="), some
agents prefer the risky technology and get insured while raising funds, thereby driving
the size of the market for risk sharing from zero to M("). By the “market size” e¤ect, a
share of the economy becomes subject to income risk (having state-contingent earnings),
thereby raising the variance of income (analytically, positive terms fall under the integral).
Moreover, average earnings grow higher than BÂ, so that also the agents on the ‡at portion
in Figure 2 contribute to raising the variance.
As investor protection improves, the “market size” e¤ect is paired with the “insur-
ance” e¤ect, that shrinks the wedge between state-contingent earnings and hence, tends
to reduce the variance. Analytically, the “insurance” e¤ect tends to reduce the term under
integration. The extent of the “market size” e¤ect is decreasing in investor protection,
due to the concavity of M at high p. On the other hand, “insurance” becomes more
e¤ective, the larger is the mass of agents that bene…t from it. This means that, when
investor protection is weak (M is small), the market-size e¤ect dominates because risk
sharing applies to a small fraction of the economy. Therefore, inequality at …rst increases
with p (and with M).
When investor protection is perfect, V ar (w) = G
¡
¼¤p=1
¢
[BÂ ¡ r ¡E (w)]2 + R 1¼¤p=1f[¼+
(1¡ ¼)']AÂ¡ r ¡E (w)g2g (¼)d¼ > 0. As p falls any lower than 1 (p = 1¡ "), the “mar-
ket size” e¤ect drives only few agents out of the risky sector, thereby reducing income
inequality by a small amount, since the di¤erence between BÂ, w h (¼¤) and wl (¼¤) is
still slight. The “insurance” e¤ect, instead, applies to a large share of the population,
and outweighs the “market size” e¤ect, so that there is an increase in income inequality.
11 Since income of the old is 1-to-1+r linked to that of the young, I focus on the earnings of the active
population only.
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Therefore, improvements upon an already very good investor protection may in fact re-
duce inequality, although never below the case of no investor protection. Lemma 3 and
Proposition 2 formalize this intuition.
Lemma 3 The variance of earnings is a non-monotonic function of investor protection:
dV ar(w)
dp > 0 in a neighborhood of p = 0, and
dV ar(w)
dp < 0 in a neighborhood of p = 1.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Since, from Proposition 1, the size of the market for risk sharing (M) is continuous
and monotonic in investor protection (p), also the relationship between the former and
income inequality follows a non-monotonic pattern.
Proposition 2 The relationship between earnings variance and the size of the market for
risk sharing, M ´ 1 ¡G (¼¤), is non-monotonic: dV ar(w)dM > 0 in a neighborhood of M(0),
and dV ar(w)dM < 0 in a neighborhood of M(1).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 2 shows that income inequality, as measured by the variance of earnings,
increases with the size of the risk-sharing market for small M and falls with large M .
However, this does not give a full characterization of the relationship between inequality
and the size of the risk-sharing market for any p. Moreover, there are alternative measures
of inequality, such as the Gini coe¢cient, that are more commonly used in empirical
work. Since a characterization of this indicator is awkward to derive analytically, I obtain
it through numerical solution. This exercise allows me to study the relationship between
investor protection, the size of the risk-sharing market and income inequality on the whole
domain of p and to obtain a more testable version of the prediction in Proposition 2.12
To simulate the model, I choose parameter values consistently with the restrictions
imposed on parameters throughout the paper.13 I approximate the distribution of ability
with a Lognormal(¹,¾) and parametrize the mean and variance of the associated Normal
distribution, ¹ and ¾; with values from the actual data. Although ability per se is di¢cult
to measure, it is likely to be re‡ected in educational attainment. Therefore, I take the
sample mean and variance of school years from the Barro and Lee (2000) database of 138
countries in 1995. Since the support of the Lognormal distribution is unbounded from
12 If the assumption that risky output in the bad state is lower than the international interest rate is
removed, some of the most able agents can …nance the risky project, even at p=0. This means that the
upper bound for the threshold ability becomes ~¼ < 1 s.t. ~¼v(A¡ r)+ (1¡ ~¼)v('A¡ r) = v(B ¡ r), and
the size of the risk-sharing market is G (~¼)¡ G (¼¤). All results hold, after this relabeling.
13 Notice that this numerical solution is for qualitative rather than quantitative purposes. Therefore, the
technological parameters are not calibrated to the actual data.
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Figure 3: Investor protection, Risk-sharing market size and income inequality. Simulation
output.
above, it must be truncated to comply with the set-up of the model. I assume the top
0.05 per cent to have ability 1, while ¼ is lognormally distributed across the remaining
99.95 per cent of the population. I parameterize ¹ and ¾ to match the US data, where the
average years of schooling are 14.258, with a variance of 26.93. I normalize the resulting
ability distribution so that it …ts in the interval [0;1], consistent with the model. I set ® =
0:33, Â = 1:5, r = 0:06, B = 1, A = 2:84, ' = 0:014, implying M(p = 1) ' 0:4.
Both the “market size” and the “insurance” e¤ects are expected to a¤ect the Gini
coe¢cients and the variance of earnings in similar ways. Panel A of Figure 3, plotting
the Gini coe¢cient against the size of the risk-sharing market, con…rms the expectations:
the Gini exhibits a non-monotonic pattern, featuring a hump with its peak at a high M .
Panel B shows market size to be a function of investor protection, with the properties
predicted by Proposition 1.
4 Empirical evidence
The model developed through sections 2 and 3 generates two main predictions: (1) Income
inequality has a hump-shaped relationship with the size of the market for risk sharing, and
(2) this market is bigger, the better is investor protection. Here, I empirically assess these
results by applying a series of cross-section and panel data methodologies. The section is
structured as follows: I …rst present the data, then the econometric techniques, and …nally
report and comment on the results.
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4.1 Data
I use a cross-section of 68 countries observed between 1980 and 2000, and a panel of 50
countries with 144 non-overlapping …ve-year observations spanning from 1976 to 2000.14
As a measure of income inequality, I take the Gini coe¢cient of the net individ-
ual income distribution from Dollar and Kraay’s (2002) database, which relies on four
sources: the UN-WIDER World Income Inequality Database, the “high quality” sample
from Deininger and Squire (1996), Chen and Ravallion (2001), and Lundberg and Squire
(2000).15
I proxy the size of the market for risk sharing with data on the …nancial structure
of countries. It can be argued that entrepreneurs bear more risk the larger their …rm’s
leverage. In terms of standard …nancial contracts, this means that …rms’ insiders achieve
more (less) risk sharing in countries where equity (debt) accounts for a larger share of
external …nance. Therefore, I use stock market capitalization as a share of total credit to
the private sector as empirical counterpart for the size of the risk-sharing market. This
variable (smpr) is constructed as the ratio between stock market capitalization over GDP
(smcap) and credit to the private sector over GDP (privo), from the database by Beck et
al. (2001) on Financial Development and Structure, which expands the data used in Beck
et al. (1999).
The indicators of investor protection and e¢ciency of the judiciary come from LLS
(2006). Both investor_pr and eff_jud are indexes scaling from 0 to 10 in ascending
order of protection and e¢ciency. See LLS (2006) for a detailed description.
When estimating equations for the Gini’s as a function of stock market capitalization
over total credit, I control for a number of other relevant variables, as suggested by the
model and by the empirical literature on inequality. In particular, I include real per capita
GDP and its square to account for technology di¤erences and the Kuznets hypothesis. I
also control for government expenditure and trade as a share of GDP. These variables
are taken from Heston and Summers’ version 6.1 of the Penn World Tables.16 I take two
14 The cross-section shrinks to 42 observations when I account for investor protection and e¢ciency of
the judiciary in the regressions, since these variables are only available for 49 countries, some of which
do not intersect with the wider dataset. I use the full panel dataset only for the static regressions. Since
18 countries have less than the three consecutive observations needed for the Arellano and Bover (1995)
estimation, I perform the dynamic panel GMM on a restricted sample of 112 observations for 32 countries.
15 The original sample consists of 953 observations, which reduce to 418 separated by at least …ve years,
on 137 countries over the period 1950-1999. Countries di¤er with respect to the survey coverage (national
vs subnational), the welfare measure (income vs expenditure), the measure of income (net vs gross) and
the unit of observation (households vs individuals). Data from Deininger and Squire are usually adjusted
by adding 6.6 to the Gini coe¢cients based on expenditure. Here, the adjustment was made in a slightly
more complicated way to account for the variety of sources; see Dollar and Kraay (2002) for details.
16 Throughout the estimations, real per capita GDP is expressed as a ratio of the …rst observation for
the US (1980 in the cross-section, 1976 in the panel).
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measures of education attainment to proxy both the level and the dispersion of human
capital. I use the share of the population aged above 25 with some secondary educa-
tion (sec 25), from the Barro and Lee’s (2000) database, and the Gini coe¢cient for the
years of education in the population aged above 15 (gh_15), constructed by Castellò and
Doménech (2002) with data from Barro and Lee (2000).
Finally, as in LLS (2006), I use legal origins, from the World Development Indicators,
as instruments in the cross-sectional analysis.
4.2 Estimation strategies
4.2.1 Cross-section
To test the predictions of the model across countries, I estimate the following static equa-
tion:
Gi(t¡k;t) = ® +¯Xi(t¡k;t) + °1smpri(t¡k;t) +°2
¡
RSi(t¡k;t)
¢2 + ²i; (4)
where Gi(t¡k;t) is the Gini coe¢cient, the terms in Xi(t¡k;t) are additional explanatory
variables, and smpri(t¡k;t) is stock market capitalization as a ratio of total credit to the
private sector. Subscripts i (t ¡ k) indicate the average of a variable observed in country i
in the period between t ¡k and t, that means 1980 and 2000 in the case of cross-sectional
regressions. Xi(t¡k;t) includes: real per capita GDP observed at time t ¡k and its square;
period averages of the share of population aged above 25, with some secondary education
(sec 25), and alternatively of the Gini coe¢cient of the years of education in the population
aged above 15 (gh_15); the period averages of government expenditure and trade as ratios
of GDP. For sensitivity analysis, I replace Gi(t¡k;t) with Git. The main result of the model
is con…rmed by the data if °^1 > 0 and °^2 < 0.
The OLS estimates of °1 and °2 may be biased if there is reverse causation between
income inequality and stock market size. To control for this possibility, I also estimate
equation (4) by Two-Stages Least Squares, using a number of investor protection indicators
as instruments for smpri(t¡k;t):
Gi(t¡k;t) = ® +¯Xi(t¡k;t) +°1smpri(t¡k;t) + °2
¡
smpri(t¡k;t)
¢2 + ei
smpri(t¡k;t) = ³ + »IPi(t¡k;t) +ui:
This strategy also allows me to evaluate the intermediate link between investor protection
and the size of the risk-sharing market. I adopt two alternative sets of instruments,
IPi(t¡k;t), for stock market capitalization over total credit: (i) the indicators of investor
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protection and e¢ciency of the judiciary suggested by LLS (2006) as determinants of
stock market development; (ii) the origin of the legal system which is, in turn, used by
LLS (2006) to instrument investor protection. The main advantage of the second set of
instruments is that these are most certainly exogenous and available for a wider cross-
section of countries. The IV estimation validates the theoretical prediction on the positive
relationship between investor protection and risk sharing, if »^ > 0 and the F statistics
of the excluded instruments from the …rst-stage regression is high. If the Sargan test
of overidentifying restrictions has a high p-value, excluding correlation between investor
protection and the residuals ei, the data suggest that the whole mechanism suggested by
the model is plausible: investor protection a¤ects income inequality precisely through its
e¤ect on the risk-sharing market.
4.2.2 Fixed and random e¤ects
To test the results of the paper both across countries and over time, I use the panel data
methodology and estimate the following equation:
Git = ® +¯0Xit + °1smprit +°2 (smprit)
2 + ´i + ºt + ²it; (5)
where Git is the average Gini coe¢cient observed in country i over a …ve-year period t, the
terms inXit and smprit are the same as for equation (4), and ´t, ºt and ²it are unobservable
country- and time-speci…c e¤ects, and the error term, respectively. I estimate equation
(5) under the alternative hypotheses of a random versus …xed idiosyncratic component ´i:
Fixed-e¤ects estimates capture the evolution of the relationship within each country over
time. Random e¤ects are more e¢cient, since they exploit all the information available
across countries and over time. However, the latter may be inconsistent if country-speci…c
e¤ects are correlated with the residuals. Including time …xed e¤ects in both regressions
allows me to account for the presence of global trends, such as skill-biased technical change,
which drives inequality worldwide. I rely on the Hausman test for the choice between FE
and RE, and an F test for the inclusion of time dummies.
4.2.3 Dynamic Panel Data
As a further evaluation of the relationship between risk-sharing market size and inequality,
I follow the latest approach of dynamic panel analysis, and focus on the expression:
git = ¸git¡1 + ~¯
0
xit + ~°1smprit + ~°2 (smprit)
2 + ´i + ºt + ²it; (6)
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where all variables are expressed in logarithms. Notice that the speci…cation in equation
(6) includes a lagged endogenous variable among the regressors. It immediately follows
that, even if ²it is not correlated with git¡1, the estimates are not consistent with a
…nite time span. Moreover, consistency may be undermined by the endogeneity of other
explanatory variables, such as income and stock market capitalization. A number of
contributions provide theoretical support (see, for instance, Banerjee and Du‡o, 2003,
Barro, 2000, Benabou, 1997, Forbes, 2003, and Lopez, 2003) and empirical treatments for
the simultaneity between growth and inequality. Feedbacks with stock market size instead
capture the reaction of capital supply to changes in the income distribution. To correct for
the bias created by lagged endogenous variables and the simultaneity of some regressors,
I adopt the approach of Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998).17 I
time-di¤erentiate both sides of (6) to obtain
¢git = ¸¢git¡1 + ~¯
0¢xit + ~°1¢smprit + ~°2¢ (smprit)2 +¢ºt +¢²it; (7)
and estimate the system of equations (6) and (7). The di¤erences in the variables that
are either endogenous or predetermined can be instrumented with their own lagged val-
ues, while lagged di¤erences are instruments for levels. For instance, I use git¡3 as an
instrument for ¢git¡1 and smprit¡2 for ¢smprit, as well as ¢git¡2 and ¢smprit¡1 for
git¡1 and smprit. The estimation is performed with a two-step System-GMM technique.
The moment conditions for the equation in di¤erences are E[¢git¡s (²it ¡ ²it¡1)] = 0 for
s ¸ 2, and – if the explanatory variables y are predetermined – E[¢yit¡s (²it ¡ ²it¡1)] = 0
for s ¸ 2. For equation (6), the additional conditions are E[¢gi;t¡s (´i + "i;t)] = 0 and
E[¢yi;t¡s (´i + "i;t)] = 0 for s = 1. The validity of the instruments is guaranteed under
the hypothesis that ²it exhibit zero second-order serial correlation. Coe¢cient estimates
are consistent and e¢cient, if both the moment conditions and the no-serial correlation
are satis…ed. I can validate the estimated model through a Sargan test of overidentifying
restrictions, and a test of second-order serial correlation of the residuals, respectively. As
pointed out by Arellano and Bond (1991), the estimates from the …rst step are more ef-
…cient, while the test statistics from the second step are more robust. Therefore, I will
report coe¢cients and statistics from the …rst and second step, respectively.
17 The system-DPD methodology dominates the di¤erence-DPD proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991),
because it amends problems of measurement error bias and weak instruments, arising from the persistence
of the regressors (as pointed out by Bond et al., 2001).
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4.3 Results
4.3.1 Cross-sectional regressions
Table 1 reports the Ordinary Least Squares estimates for di¤erent versions of equation (4).
Columns 1-7 suggest human capital and stock market development to be the major forces
driving income inequality. As predicted by the model, °^1 is positive and signi…cant for both
measures of stock market development, while °^2 is negative. According to the estimates,
an increase in the relative size of the stock market should start reducing inequality after
smpr has crossed a level that only three countries have reached in the sample. The
fact that only very few countries are beyond the point where the relationship between risk
sharing and inequality becomes negative may explain the low statistical signi…cance for °^2.
Moreover, the model predicts that inequality should never completely revert, even when
the stock market achieves its maximum relative size; hence, it is reasonable to expect the
linear term to be generally more signi…cant, as is the case in Table 1.
In column 3, I control separately for stock market size and a measure of overall …nancial
development, the ratio of credit to the private sector over GDP (privo). Interestingly, the
coe¢cient estimates suggest that equity-like and debt-like …nance have opposite e¤ects on
income inequality (positive and negative, respectively), as predicted by the model. The
negative coe¢cient for privo is in line with the evidence by Beck et al. (2006) and Clarke
et al. (2006), while the positive coe¢cient for smpr is novel in the literature.
The signi…cant, negative coe¢cients on sec 25 through columns 1-3 and 6, in line
with most empirical evidence, mean that inequality tends to be lower, the larger is the
share of the population with high education. The positive and signi…cant estimates for
gh_15 in columns 4-5 show that the dispersion of human capital boosts income inequality.
However, the coe¢cients for sec25 and gh_15 jointly estimated (column 6) suggest that
the former is more signi…cant. Given that sec 25 dominates gh_15, I will henceforth report
the results obtained with sec 25 only. Finally, for the Kuznets hypothesis to hold, the
estimated coe¢cients of GDP and (GDP)2 should be positive and negative, respectively.
The results in Table 1 do not allow me to validate this hypothesis, due to the lack of
signi…cance of both coe¢cients.
To get a quantitative ‡avor of the implications of column 2 and 3, take pairs of countries
with similar human capital (the other main determinant of inequality) but di¤erent relative
size of the stock market, and compare the actual Gini di¤erentials with their predicted
values. Venezuela and South Africa, for instance, had very similar school attainment (29.3
and 28.5 per cent of the population aged above 25 with secondary education), while stock
market capitalization over GDP was eleven times larger in South Africa. Column 3 would
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predict a lower Gini coe¢cient in Venezuela, with a di¤erence of about 19 points: very
close to the actual 18. Consider also Austria, which had the same level of secondary school
attainment as Switzerland (65.1 vs 65.3), but a much less developed stock market (smpr
was seven times smaller). Its predicted Gini (from the estimates in column 2) is lower
than the Swiss by 6.8 vs the actual 7.1 points.18
The results in Table 1 support the main prediction of the model on the relationship
between size of the risk-sharing market and income inequality, but cannot provide evidence
on the mechanism generating it, starting from investor protection. To see if investor
protection a¤ects income inequality independently from the risk-sharing market, I …rst
regress the Gini coe¢cient on the control variables in X and LLS’s indicator of investor
protection, and then add smpr. Table 2 shows that investor_pr has indeed a positive
and signi…cant e¤ect on income inequality. However, the coe¢cients in columns 2 and
3 suggest that this e¤ect is absorbed by stock market capitalization over total credit,
once I control for it. Moreover, column 3 support the hypothesis that investor protection
has no e¤ect on inequality, unless paired by a bigger relative size of the stock market.
These results suggest that investor protection only a¤ects income inequality through the
development of the equity market relative to debt.
The instrumental variables estimates reported in Table 3 are meant to explicitly ac-
count for the intermediate step linking risk sharing to the degree of investor protection.
Estimating the …rst step of the IV regressions allows me to partially replicate the analysis
in LLS (2006) to verify the predictive power of investor protection and e¢ciency of the
judiciary on the size of the market for risk sharing. The coe¢cients from the …rst step
estimations in column 3 of Panel A con…rm that better investor protection and e¢ciency
of the judiciary system boost the development of the market for risk sharing. Since these
variables could be endogenous, I replace them with legal origins when estimating the …rst
step for smpr. Columns 1-2 con…rm the results in LLS (2006) that the common law (UK)
legal origin strongly promoted the development of stock markets.
Panel B of Table 3 reports the coe¢cient estimated in the second step, instrumenting
smpr with legal origins and investor protection. The estimates for the relative size of the
stock market strongly support the prediction that °1 > 0. The p-values of the F and
Sargan tests guarantee that both sets of instruments are valid. In other words, investor
protection is a good predictor for smpr (result 1), and only a¤ects inequality through
stock market development. Estimating equation (4) instrumenting both the linear and
the quadratic terms for smpr is problematic, given the collinearity of the instruments.
18 Remember that the Gini coe¢cient can, in principle, take values between zero and one hundred, and
ranges between 22.6 and 58.3 in the sample.
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Therefore, I try to capture the non linearity in the e¤ect of stock market development
on income inequality by re-estimating the equations of column 1 on a restricted sample,
excluding the countries with bigger stock markets (those with smpr> 1.5). The coe¢cient
°1, reported in column 2 of Panel B, is higher than the one in column 1. This suggests
that the relationship between the relative size of the stock market and the Gini’s tend to
revert when the market for risk sharing is big enough.
So far, I have regressed the average of the Gini coe¢cients between 1980 and 2000 on
the average relative size of the stock market in the same period. To verify if the results are
sensitive to the timing of observations, I replicate the regressions of Tables 1 and 3 in two
alternative ways. First, I replace the average Gini with its latest available observation,
after 1985, and keep the regressors as in the previous estimates. The results are reported
in columns 1-4 of Table 4 and do not display major di¤erences from Table 1 and 3. As a
further check, I focus on the period 1985-2000 and regress the average Gini on the initial
values of smpr. In this case, I do not need to perform instrumental variables estimations,
since reverse causality is arguably ruled out by the choice of the timing of observations.
As shown in columns 5 and 6 of Table 4, the estimates for the linear term of stock market
size remain positive and signi…cant, while those for its square lose signi…cance. Overall,
the evidence from the sensitivity analysis favors strongly the existence of a positive °1
and, to a weaker extent, of a negative °2:
Finally, the robustness of the results is tested in Table 5, which reports the estimates
of equation (5) where government expenditure and trade (as a ratio of GDP) are added as
additional regressors. There are no major changes from Tables 1 and 3, and the additional
coe¢cients are not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero.
4.3.2 Panel regressions
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 6 report the coe¢cients of equation (5) estimated with random
and …xed e¤ects on a panel of 50 countries, with 5-year observations spanning between
1976 and 2000.19 The estimates con…rm the existence of a positive °1, but do not provide
strong support for °2 < 0: The estimates in column 3 are in line with the results from
the cross-section on the opposite e¤ects of equity-like vis-à-vis debt-like …nance on income
inequality. Education turns out to be negatively related to inequality throughout all
estimations, consistently with most of the empirical literature. The Kuznets hypothesis is
not validated by the results in Table 6. In conclusion, the static panel analysis suggests
19 For all equations I ran regressions with both …xed and random e¤ects, then I chose the best speci…cation
relying on the (reported) Hausman test and reported coe¢cient estimates only for that one. The other
results are available upon request.
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that stock market development plays as important a role as education in shaping income
distribution.
The regression in Table 6 exploit the variation of inequality and market size across
countries and through time. It cannot, though, account for the existence of dynamic
feedbacks between inequality and stock market development. To overcome these method-
ological limitations, I adopt the approach of Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and
Bond (1998), and estimate various versions of system (6)-(7).
Table 7 reports the coe¢cients estimated with the two-step system GMM à la Arellano
and Bover (1995). These results support again the existence of a signi…cant positive linear
relationship between the Gini’s and the relative size of the stock market. The quadratic
term is also signi…cant and exhibits the expected negative sign. The estimates in column
3 imply that stock market development has signi…cant e¤ects on income inequality in
the short run, while the dynamic analysis suggests that these e¤ects persist also in long
run, with coe¢cients °1= .36 and °2=-.212. The positive °1 remains signi…cant after the
inclusion of time, as well as time-continent e¤ects.20 All estimated coe¢cients for the
lagged Gini’s support the convergence hypothesis for income inequality, as in previous
empirical work by Benabou (1996), Lopez (2003) and Ravallion (2002). As in the cross-
sectional and static panel regressions, the Kuznets’ hypothesis …nds no support and the
predictive power of human capital becomes weaker.
When shifting from the static to the dynamic panel regressions, the countries with less
than three consecutive observations are dropped from the sample. To make the results
from the two panel techniques comparable, I replicate the Fixed and Random E¤ects
estimates on the reduced sample and report the coe¢cients in columns 4-6 of Table 6.
The coe¢cients for smpr and its square are positive and negative, respectively, and both
signi…cantly di¤erent from zero, as in the dynamic panel of Table7.
As a robustness check, I re-estimate the equations in Tables 6 and 7 with government
expenditure and trade over GDP as additional regressors, and report the results in Table 8.
Both static and dynamic regressions support the prediction of a positive °1 and negative
°2. The estimates for government expenditure, which are non-signi…cantly di¤erent from
zero, re‡ect the ambiguity of theoretical predictions and previous empirical evidence.
Neither are the coe¢cients for trade openness signi…cantly di¤erent from zero.
20 Results with time-continent e¤ects are available upon request.
23
4.3.3 Summary
The estimates reported in this section suggest that the development of the market for
risk sharing, proxied by the size of the stock market relative to private credit, tends
to raise income inequality. The declining part of the hump predicted by the model is
supported in a less robust way by the data. This evidence can be reconciled with the
model, since the Gini coe¢cient is not expected to revert completely, even at very high
levels of market development. Dynamic panel estimates showthat the relationship between
stock market development and income inequality continues to hold in the long run. Results
from the cross-sectional regressions con…rm the prediction that investor protection only
a¤ects income inequality through the development of the risk-sharing market.
5 Conclusions
This paper provides theoretical predictions and empirical support for a systematic re-
lationship between investor protection, risk sharing and income inequality. I develop an
overlapping generation model with risk-averse agents, heterogeneous in their ability, where
production can take place with a safe or a risky technology. In the presence of …nancial
frictions, arising from the non-observability of realizations and imperfect investor pro-
tection, I study the occupational and …nancial choices for di¤erent ability groups. Better
investor protection promotes risk sharing between entrepreneurs and …nanciers and a¤ects
income inequality in a number of ways. First, it provides insiders with better insurance,
thereby reducing income volatility for a given mass of risky entrepreneurs. Second, it
raises the share of agents that choose the risky technology and are thereby exposed to
earning risk. Finally, since ability a¤ects risky payo¤s, better investor protection also
increases the overall reward to ability. The …rst e¤ect tends to reduce inequality, while
the other two boost it. The main result of the paper is that income dispersion increases
at …rst with the size of the market for risk sharing, and then declines. In the empirical
section, I provide evidence consistent with the predictions of the model.
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A Proofs
Lemma 1
The assumptions that A > B and 'A < B together with continuity of Vi in ¼i imply
the existence of a unique point ¼¤ 2 (0;1) where V ¤ = BÂ¡r: From this, it follows that for
¼i = 1,
¡
1 ¡ µhi
¢
AÂ = (AÂ ¡ r) > BÂ ¡ r, hence Vi = v £¡1 ¡ µhi ¢AÂ; r¤ > v (BÂ ¡ r;r),
and for ¼i = 0,
¡
1 ¡ µli
¢
'AÂ = 'AÂ ¡ r < BÂ ¡ r, thus Vi = v £¡1 ¡ µli¢'AÂ; r¤ <
v (BÂ ¡ r; r) : To prove that ¼¤ is a threshold, I just need to show that Vi is increasing in
¼i. The derivative of Vi w. r. t. ¼i under the optimal equity contract is
dVi
d¼i
= v
h³
1 ¡ µhi
´
AÂ; r
i
¡ v
h³
1 ¡ µli
´
'AÂ; r
i
+
£
¼iv0h + (1 ¡ ¼i)v0l
¤
pAÂ > 0:
Therefore, 8¼i ¸ ¼¤; ¼iv £¡1 ¡ µhi ¢AÂ;r¤ + (1 ¡ ¼i)v £¡1 ¡ µli¢'AÂ; r¤ ¸ v (BÂ ¡ r; r).
Lemma 2
To prove that the threshold ability is decreasing in investor protection, I obtain the
derivative of ¼¤ with respect to p;
d¼¤
dp
= ¡dV
dp
µ
dV
d¼
¶¡1
;
and show that it is negative. I have derived dVd¼¤ > 0 in the proof of Lemma 1. I just need
to derive
dV
dp
= ¼i (1 ¡ ¼i) (1 ¡ ')A¡v0l ¡ v0h¢ :
Notice that dVdp > 0 for any ¼, since utility is concave. It follows that
d¼¤
dp < 0:
To prove that the threshold is convex in investor protection, I need to prove that
d2¼¤
(dp)2
> 0.
d2¼¤
(dp)2
=
d2V
d¼dp
dV
dp ¡ d2V(dp)2 dVd¼¡dV
d¼
¢2
= ¡
µ
dV
d¼
¶¡1©
¼¤ (1 ¡¼¤)AÂ ¡v0l ¡ v0h¢ +AÂ £¼¤v0h + (1 ¡¼¤)v0l¤
¡ p(AÂ)2¼¤ (1 ¡ ¼¤) (1 ¡') ¡v00l ¡ v00h¢o d¼¤dp
¡
µ
dV
d¼
¶¡1n
(AÂ)2 (1 ¡ ')2 ¼¤ (1 ¡ ¼¤) £¼¤v00h +(1 ¡¼¤)v00l ¤o :
All terms divided by dVd¼ are positive, since the CRRA speci…cation of the utility function
implies that v0l > v0h and v00l < v00h , and d¼
¤
dp · 0. Therefore, d
2¼¤
(dp)2
= ¡ (> 0)¡1 f(¸ 0)+
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(> 0)¡ (· 0)g (· 0)¡ (> 0)¡1 f< 0g > 0.
Proposition 1
To prove the increasing monotonicity of the size of the risk-sharing market, and its
concavity at high levels of investor protection, I derive
dM
dp
= ¡g (¼¤) d¼
¤
dp
d2M
(dp)2
= ¡g0 (¼¤)
µ
d¼¤
dp
¶2
¡ g (¼¤) d
2¼¤
(dp)2
:
From Lemma 1, d¼¤dp · 0, that implies dMdp ¸ 0; hence, the size of the market for risk sharing
is increasing in investor protection. From Lemma 2, d
2¼¤
(dp)2
> 0. Moreover, lim
p!1
d¼¤
dp =
lim
p!1
³
dV
dp
.
dV
d¼
´
= lim
p!1
¼(1¡¼)(1¡')[v0(wl;r)¡v0(wh ;r)]
v(wh ;r)¡v(wl;r)+[¼v0(wh;r)+(1¡¼)v0(wl;r)]pA = 0. It follows that M is
concave in p in a neighborhood of p = 1, since lim
p!1
d2M
(dp)2
< 0.
Corollary 1
By optimality of factor employment in the …nal good sector, KY = Y£
h
®
r(1¡®)
i1¡®
,
which can be re-written, after substituting Y with Y D, as KY =¡2+r+¯1+¯
n
G (¼¤)BÂ +
R 1
¼¤ f[¼+
(1¡ ¼) ']Ag (¼) d¼ ¡ r
o
, with ¡ =
h
®
r(1¡®)
i1¡®
. The …rst derivative of MF w.r.t. p is
dMF
dp
= ¡d¼
¤
dp
g (¼¤)
(1 + ¡Y )2
½
1 + ¡2 + r +¯
1 + ¯
½
AÂ
Z 1
¼¤
[¼ +(1 ¡ ¼)'] d¼
¡ [1 ¡G (¼¤)]AÂ [¼¤ +(1 ¡¼¤)'] +BÂ ¡ r
oo
;
Risk-sharing …nance as a ratio of total external …nance is increasing in investor protection,
d MF
dp ¸ 0 for any p 2 [0;1], since d¼¤dp · 0 and the term in brackets is always positive. To
prove concavity of MF in a neighborhood of p = 1, I derive
d2MF
(dp)2
= ¡d
2¼¤
(dp)2
g (¼¤)
(1 + ¡Y )2
µ
1 +¡2 + r + ¯
1 + ¯
ª
¶
¡
µ
d¼¤
dp
¶2 g0 (¼¤)
(1 + ¡Y )2
µ
1 +¡
2 + r + ¯
1 +¯
ª
¶
+
µ
d¼¤
dp
¶2 g (¼¤)
(1 + ¡Y )2
¡
2 + r + ¯
1 +¯
ª[1 ¡ G (¼¤)] AÂ(1 ¡ ')
¡2
µ
d¼¤
dp
¶2 g (¼¤)2
(1 + ¡Y )3
µ
1 +¡2 + r + ¯
1 + ¯
ª
¶
¡2 + r +¯
1 +¯
£AÂ [¼¤ +(1 ¡ ¼¤)'] ¡ BÂ;
ª ´ AÂ
Z 1
¼¤
[¼ +(1 ¡¼)']d¼ ¡AÂ [1 ¡ G (¼¤)] [¼¤ +(1 ¡¼¤)'] + BÂ ¡ r:
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As lim
p!1
d¼¤
dp = 0, while
d2¼¤
(dp)2
> 0 at any p, lim
p!1
d2 MF
(dp)2
< 0.
Lemma 3
To prove non monotonicity, I di¤erentiate V ar (w) with respect to p:
dV ar (w)
dp
= d¼
¤
dp
½
g (¼¤) [BÂ ¡ r ¡ E (w)]2 ¡ 2G (¼¤) [BÂ ¡ r ¡E (w)] dE (w)
d¼¤
¾
¡d¼
¤
dp
g (¼¤)
½
¼¤
h
wh (¼¤) ¡E (w)
i2
+(1 ¡ ¼¤)
h
wl (¼¤) ¡ E (w)
i2¾
+
d¼¤
dp
dE (w)
d¼¤ 2
Z 1
¼¤
n
¼
h
wh ¡E (w)
i
+(1 ¡¼)
h
wl ¡ E (w)
io
g (¼)d¼
+2
Z 1
¼¤
½
¼
dwh
dp
h
wh ¡E (w)
i
+ (1 ¡ ¼) dw
l
dp
h
wl ¡ E (w)
io
g (¼)d¼
=
d¼¤
dp
g (¼¤)
½
[BÂ ¡ r ¡ E (w)]2 ¡¼¤
h
wh (¼¤) ¡E (w)
i2
¡ (1 ¡¼¤)
h
wl (¼¤) ¡ E (w)
i2¾
¡2 (1 ¡ ')AÂ
Z 1
¼¤
¼ (1 ¡¼)
³
wh ¡ wl
´
g (¼)d¼:
Notice that the term in the …rst two lines represents the market size e¤ect and is positive
for all p, while the last line accounts for the risk sharing e¤ect and is negative for all p.
For p ! 0, ¼¤ ! 1, E (w) ! BÂ ¡ r, wh ! AÂ ¡ r, wl ! 'AÂ ¡ r. Therefore,
lim
p!0
dV ar (w)
dp
= ¡d¼
¤
dp
g (1) (A ¡ B)2 Â2 > 0:
For p ! 1, ¼¤ ! ¼¤p=1 = B¡'A(1¡')A, wh (¼¤) ¡ wl (¼¤) ! 0, wh
¡
¼¤p=1
¢ ! wl ¡¼¤p=1¢ =£
¼¤p=1 +
¡
1 ¡ ¼¤p=1
¢
'
¤
AÂ¡ r = BÂ¡ r, d¼¤dp ! 0. I study how dV ar(w)dp approaches zero in
a left neighborhood of p = 1 by means of Taylor’s …rst-order approximation. Notice that
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d2V ar (w)
(dp)2
=
"
d2¼¤
(dp)2
g (¼¤)+
µ
d¼¤
dp
¶2
g0 (¼¤)
#n
[BÂ ¡ r ¡E (w)]2
¡¼¤
h
wh (¼¤) ¡E (w)
i2 ¡ (1 ¡ ¼¤) hwl (¼¤) ¡E (w)i2¾
+
d¼¤
dp
g (¼¤)
½
2
d¼¤
dp
dE (w)
d¼¤ f[¼
¤ +(1 ¡ ¼¤)']AÂ ¡ BÂg
+2¼¤ (1 ¡ ¼¤) (1 ¡')2 (AÂ)2 ¡ d¼
¤
dp
½h
wh (¼¤) ¡E (w)
i2
¡
h
wl (¼¤) ¡ E (w)
i2¾
+ 2(1 ¡ ')2 (AÂ)2
Z 1
¼¤p=1
¼ (1 ¡ ¼) g (¼)d¼:
It follows that, in a neighborhood to the left of p = 1;
dV ar (w)
dp
= 2 (p ¡ 1) (1 ¡')2 (AÂ)2
Z 1
¼¤p=1
¼ (1 ¡¼) g (¼)d¼ < 0:
Proposition 2
Recall from Proposition 1 that M is increasing in p. I characterize the relationship
between the size of the risk-sharing market and the variance of earnings by studying
dV ar (w)
dM
=
dV ar (w)
dp
µ
dM
dp
¶¡1
= ¡ [BÂ ¡ r ¡ E (w)]2 +(1 ¡ ¼¤)
h
wl (¼¤) ¡ E (w)
i2
+¼¤
h
wh (¼¤) ¡E (w)
i2
+
·
d¼¤
dp
g (¼¤)
¸¡1
£
2 (1 ¡')2 (AÂ)2 (1 ¡ p)
Z 1
¼¤
¼ (1 ¡ ¼) g (¼)d¼
For p ! 0, ¼¤ ! 1, E (w) ! BÂ ¡ r, wh ! AÂ ¡ r, wl ! 'AÂ ¡ r, hence
lim
p!0
dV ar (w)
dM
= (A ¡ B)2 Â2 > 0:
For p ! 1, ¼¤ ! ¼¤p=1 = B¡'A(1¡')A, wh (¼¤) ¡ wl (¼¤) ! 0, wh
¡
¼¤p=1
¢ ! wl ¡¼¤p=1¢ =
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£
¼¤p=1 +
¡
1 ¡ ¼¤p=1
¢¤
AÂ¡ r = BÂ ¡ r, and d¼¤dp ! 0. It thus follows that
lim
p!1
dV ar (w)
dM (p)
= lim
p!1
d
dp
h
2(1 ¡')2 (AÂ)2 (1 ¡ p) R 1¼¤ ¼ (1 ¡ ¼) g (¼)d¼i
d
dp
h
d¼¤
dp g (¼¤)
i
= 2
Z 1
¼¤p=1
¼ (1 ¡¼) g (¼)d¼ v (BÂ ¡ r) +AÂv
0 (BÂ ¡ r)
¼¤p=1
³
1 ¡¼¤p=1
´
g
³
¼¤p=1
´
v00 (BÂ ¡ r)
< 0;
since v00 < 0 for any CRRA utility function.
B Closed economy
In this section, I show how the economy can be closed without a¤ecting the main results
discussed in sections 2 and 3. Assume that capital and intermediate goods can no longer
be imported or exported. It follows that their prices will be pinned down by domestic
demand and supply: rt = ® YtKY t , and Ât = (1 ¡ ®) YtXt . Further, capital will follow the law
of motion:
Kt+1 =
1
1 + ¯
(
G (¼¤t )BÂt +AÂt
Z 1
¼¤t
[¼ + (1 ¡ ¼) '] g (¼)d¼ ¡ rt
)
; (8)
where the RHS is aggregate savings. Aggregate capital is allocated between the …nal and
the intermediate good sectors:
Kt+1 ´ KY t+1 + 1:
The aggregate supply of intermediate goods, Xt, equals total production of safe and risky
projects:
Xt = G (¼¤t )B + A
Z 1
¼¤t
[¼ + (1 ¡¼)']g (¼)d¼:
Notice that the production of intermediate goods Xt is decreasing in the threshold
ability ¼¤t . Optimal technology adoption maintains the threshold property of Lemma 1,
since agents take prices as given and the risky payo¤s are still increasing in ability. In any
period, the threshold ability ¼¤t satis…es:
¼¤tv
³
wht (¼
¤
t ) ; rt+1
´
+ (1 ¡¼¤t )v
³
wlt (¼
¤
t ) ; rt+1
´
= v (BÂt ¡ rt; rt+1) : (9)
Equations (9) and (8) characterize the dynamic equilibrium. In the next sections, I
report numerical solutions for the steady state and the transition dynamics. In particular, I
show that Lemmas 2-3 and Propositions 1-2 continue to hold in the steady state. Moreover,
along the transition between steady states with di¤erent investor protection, the size of
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the risk-sharing market converges monotonically. Income inequality may instead converge
along an oscillatory path, as a consequence of the dynamics of prices and capital.
B.1 The dynamics
The dynamics of the closed economy satis…es equations (??) and (9):
¼¤tv
³
wht (¼
¤
t ) ; rt+1
´
+ (1 ¡ ¼¤t )v
³
wlt (¼
¤
t ) ; rt+1
´
= v (BÂt ¡ rt; rt+1)
Kt+1 =
1
1 + ¯
(
G (¼¤t )BÂt + AÂt
Z 1
¼¤t
[¼ +(1 ¡ ¼)'] g (¼)d¼ ¡ rt
)
Di¤erently from the small open economy, equilibrium earnings wt (¼i) now depend also
on factor prices, that are functions of the threshold ability (¼¤t ), and of the capital employed
in the …nal sector (KY t = Kt¡ 1). Given Kt (which is predetermined), an increase in the
hiding cost p raises the left-hand side of equation (9), which would determine a drop in the
threshold ability ¼¤. A lower threshold would in turn imply an increase in the production
of intermediate goods (X t) and in the demand of capital in the …nal good sector (KY t),
and therefore a drop in the price of intermediate goods (Ât) and a rise in the interest rate
(rt). These changes in factor prices would feed back into equation (9), reducing both the
left and the right-hand sides. In general equilibrium, the overall e¤ect on the threshold
depends on which side drops more. Notice however, that under perfect investor protection
the threshold ability does not depend on relative factor prices, since ¼¤p=1 = A¡B(1¡')A:
Since the analytical characterization of the dynamic equilibrium becomes awkward, I
proceed by means of numerical solutions. The main results are displayed in Figures 4-6.
In all simulations, I adopt the following parametrization: A = 150, B = 100, ® = 0:33,
¯ = 0:17 (equivalent to a six per cent annual discount for thirty years, i.e. a generation),
and G uniform in [0; 1].
Notice that, in the absence of investor protection, a minimum initial capital is required
in order for production of the intermediate good, and hence of the …nal good too, to be
feasible: K0 > 11¡® (which makes sure that BÂ(¼
¤ = 1) > r(¼¤ = 1)). Also, even in under
perfect investor protection (p = 1), no young agent chooses the risky technology if capital
is so scarce that the repayment due by an entrepreneur with ability 1 exceeds her cash
‡ow: K < ®1¡®
B
A (which makes sure that AÂ(¼
¤ = 1) > r(¼¤ = 1)). Given that ® = 0:33,
at p = 1 there is a non-zero market for risk sharing, whenever capital satis…es K > 11¡® .
Figure 4 describes the dynamics of an economy that starts with a very low capital
endowment, K0 = 0.5+ 11¡®, and an intermediate degree of investor protection, p = 0:5.
When K0 is very low, the interest rate is so high relative to the price of the intermediate
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good that no young agent chooses the risky technology. Hence, the market for risk sharing
is inactive and inequality is zero. As capital is accumulated, the interest rate falls and
the price of intermediates rises. When the ratio r=Â becomes low enough, some young
agents prefer the risky project and raise capital through the risk-sharing market. This
implies that some income inequality arises due to the “market size” e¤ect, as in the model
of sections 2-3. The adjustment of capital and prices continues until the steady state
is reached. Decreasing marginal productivity of capital guarantees the existence of the
steady state.
Notice that the price of intermediate goods (Â) a¤ects inequality also by changing
the earnings di¤erentials between safe and risky entrepreneurs. The higher Â, the wider
the earnings di¤erentials, the higher inequality (“price” e¤ect). This implies that, with
endogenous prices, inequality may vary even if stock market size does not.
Figure 5 shows the adjustment after a policy change that increases investor protection
from p = 0 to p = 0:05, starting from the steady state. Due to the convexity of ¼¤t in p,
the risky intermediate sector expands remarkably in response to the policy change. The
marginal productivity of capital in the …nal sector rises sharply because the production of
intermediates increases. This causes an overshooting of the interest rate, that gradually
declines with capital accumulation to its new (higher) steady state level. Inequality im-
mediately jumps up and oscillates around its new (higher) steady state level until capital
and prices are stable.
If the policy change occurs at high levels of investor protection, as shown in …gure 6
for p from 0.85 to 0.9, the e¤ect on productivity of factors (hence prices) is weaker. An
increase in p induces a small increase in the size of the risky intermediate sector, and
has virtually no e¤ect on the interest rate. Inequality falls, since the “risk sharing” e¤ect
outweighs the “market size” e¤ect at high levels of investor protection.
B.2 The steady state
In the steady state, Kt+1 = Kt = K and ¼¤t+1= ¼¤t = ¼¤. The equilibrium is the solution
to the system:
VV ´ ¼¤v
³
wh (¼¤) ; r
´
+(1 ¡ ¼¤)v
³
wl (¼¤) ; r
´
¡ v (BÂ ¡ r; r) = 0
KK ´ (1 + ¯)K ¡G (¼¤) (BÂ ¡ r) ¡
Z 1
¼¤
h
¼wh (¼) + (1 ¡ ¼)wl (¼)
i
g (¼)d¼ = 0:
In the presence of perfect investor protection, the threshold ability does not depend on
factor prices and is equal to B¡'A(1¡')A as in the small open economy. Figure 7 plots the
comparative statics for all levels of investor protection p 2 [0;1] in the steady state, which
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Figure 4: Dynamics from a low initial capital endowment (K=0.5+ 11¡®) to the steady
state, given p=0.5.
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Figure 5: Dynamic adjustment after a policy change from p=0 to p=0.05.
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Figure 7: Comparative statics for varying investor protection across steady states.
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shows that Lemmas 1-3 and Propositions 1-2 continue to hold in the closed economy. In
fact, the “price” e¤ect, that a¤ects inequality along the dynamics, is irrelevant in the
steady state. Therefore, the comparative statics on investor protection is driven by the
“market size” and “insurance” e¤ects only, as in the small open economy.
C Simulation details
This section describes step by step the procedure I followed for simulating the small
open economy of section 2 and 3 (and the closed economy in the previous section of the
Appendix).
1. Give values for the main parameters (A; B; '; ¯; ®) and the interest rate, and
compute the threshold ability with perfect investor protection
¡
¼¤p=1
¢
.
2. Compute values for the parameters of the Lognormal distribution of abilities, (¹;¾),
from Barro and Lee’s (2000) data. The database provides observations for the per-
centages of the population aged 15 and above with no, primary, secondary and
tertiary education (lu, lp, ls, lh), along with the average year of each education level
(pyr, syr, hyr). I compute the average years of schooling for people with primary,
secondary and tertiary education (q1, q2, q3, respectively):
q1 =
pyr
lp + ls + lh
; q2 = q1 +
syr
ls + lh
;q3 = q1 + q2 +
hyr
lh
:
The average years of schooling and their variance are then
E (Q) =
3X
i=1
liqi
V (Q) =
3X
i=0
li (qi ¡E (Q))2 ;
with l0 = lu, l1 = lp, l2 = ls and l3 = lh. Group the countries in low-income,
middle-income and high-income following the WDI criterion and take the average
values of E (Q) and V (Q). Finally, ¹ and ¾ can be derived from the expressions for
mean and variance of the Lognormal distribution:
E (Q) = e¹+
¾2
2
V (Q) = e2¹+2¾
2 ¡ e¹+¾2:
3. De…ne a grid of 101 degrees of investor protection p 2 [0; 1], and a grid of initial
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guesses for the threshold ability ¼¤ 2 £¼¤p=1;1¤, equally spaced by 0.0001 (the …ner
the grid, the better the approximation).
4. Draw ¦ =10001 ability levels from a Lognormal (¹;¾) and sort them in ascending or-
der. Identify the ability level ¼:9995 : G (¼:9995) = 0:9995 and divide every ¼ · ¼:9995
by this …gure. Replace all ¼ > ¼:9995 by 1, so that the distribution is normalized to
values included in [0;1], and truncated in a way that makes the top 0.05 per cent of
the population successful with certainty. Compute the Cdf of ability,
G (¼i) =
# of realizations ¼ · ¼i
¦
:
5. For every degree of investor protection p
(a) compute ¼¤ (p) as the solution to the technology choice problem. In particular,
recursively …nd the point in the grid of ¼¤ satisfying:
log (B ¡ r) = ¼¤ log
³
wh
´
+(1 ¡¼¤) log
³
wl
´
(10)
wh = A [¼¤p (1 ¡') +' + (1 ¡ p) (1 ¡')] ¡ r
wl = A [¼¤p (1 ¡') +'] ¡ r > 0:
(b) For every ability ¼
i. draw the earning realization:
w =
(
B ¡ r
A [¼¤p (1 ¡') +' + (1 ¡ p) (1 ¡') ²] ¡ r
¼ < ¼¤
¼ ¸ ¼¤
² » Bi (N; ¼) , with N = # of ¼ ¸ ¼¤:
ii. sort w and derive its cumulative density function as F (wi) = # of realizations w·wi¦
iii. compute the Lorenz Curve as L (wm) = mean of w·wmmean of w m¦ for m = 1; 2; :::¦
iv. compute the Gini coe¢cient as Gini = 1 ¡ 2 P¦m=1 L(wm)¦
(c) save the threshold and the Gini in (1 £ p) vectors, ¼¤ (p) and Gini(p), the earn-
ings realizations, their distribution and the Lorenz curve in (p £¦) matrices,
w (p;¼), F (p; w (p; ¼)) and L(p; w (p;¼))
When simulating the closed economy, step 1 does not specify r.
Step 5.(a) …nds the threshold ability ¼¤t (p) which solves (10) for a given initial capital
Kt, taking into account that Ât = (1 ¡®) (Kt ¡ 1)® £
n
A
P1
i=¼¤t
[¼i+ (1¡ ¼i) '] g (¼i)+
G(¼¤) B
o¡®
and rt = ® (Kt ¡ 1)®¡1 £
n
A
P1
i=¼¤t
[¼i+ (1 ¡¼i) ']g (¼i) +G (¼¤) B
o1¡®
.
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After step 5.(c), capital in the next period is computed as Kt+1 =
P1
i=0 wi¡ r and
plugged into step 5.a. as new initial capital Kt. This recursion goes on until the steady
state is reached and Kt = Kt+1.
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Country CL CS PL PS Country CL CS PL PS
Australia y y y y Kenya y y
Austria y Korea y y y y
Bangladesh y y y Malaysia y y y y
Barbados y Mauritius y y
Belgium y y y Mexico y y y y
Bolivia y Nepal y
Botswana y Netherlands y y y y
Bulgaria y New Zealand y y y y
Brazil y y y y Norway y y y y
Canada y y y y Pakistan y y y y
Chile y y y Panama y
China y y Paraguay y
Colombia y y y Peru y y y y
Costa Rica y y y Philippines y y y
Denmark y y y y Poland y y y
Ecuador y y y Portugal y y y
Egypt y y y Romania y
El Salvador y Russia y y
Finland y y y y Singapore y y y y
France y y y y Slovak Republic y
Germany y y y y South Africa y y
Ghana y y y Spain y y y y
Greece y y Sri Lanka y y y y
Guatemala y Sweden y y y y
Honduras y Switzerland y
Hong Kong y y y y Taiwan y y y y
Hungary y y Thailand y y y y
India y y y y Trinidad and Tobago y y y
Indonesia y y y y Tunisia y y
Iran y Turkey y y y
Ireland y United Kingdom y y y y
Israel y y United States y y y y
Italy y y y y Uruguay y y
Jamaica y y Venezuela y y y y
Japan y y y y Zambia y
Jordan y y y y Zimbabwe y y
Countries and Samples
Table A
Note: C and P stand for cross-sectional and panel datasets, respectively. 
L and S for large and small samples.
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Table 1. Risk-sharing market and income inequality 
OLS - cross-section - 1980-2000 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Smpr  .038  .142**   .035  .142**  .141** 
 (.029) (.032)  (.029) (.032) (.033) 
Smpr2  -.033**   -.034** -.034** 
  (.008)   (.008) (.008) 
Smcap    .252**     
   (.085)    
Smcap2   -.069*     
   (.036)    
Privo   -.089*    
   (.049)    
Sec25 -.185** -.197** -.214**   -.133 
 (.056) (.052) (.063)   (.085) 
Gh_15     .114*  .149**  .070 
    (.058) (.061) (.086) 
GDP -.099 -.157 -.173* -.061 -.088 -.123 
 (.122) (.109) (.106) (.127) (.114) (.119) 
GDP2  .115  .162  .169  .008  .034  .116 
 (.126) (.113) (.106) (.122) (.106) (.121) 
R2  .499  .579  .562  .472  .555  .573 
Obs.   68   68   68   67   67   67 
The dependent variable is the average Gini coefficient between 1980 and 
2000. Real per capita GDP and education (sec25 and gh_15) are in initial 
values, financial variables (smpr, smcap and privo) are in sample averages. 
All regressions include a dummy for Latin American countries. Coefficients 
are estimated with Ordinary Least Squares. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parenthesis, 5 and 10 per cent significant coefficients are marked 
with ** and *, respectively. 
 
Table 2. Risk-sharing market, investor protection and income inequality 
OLS - cross-section - 1980-2000 
 1 2 3 
Investor_pr  .008* -.001 -.009* 
 (.005) (.005) (.005) 
Smpr   .101**  
  (.025)  
Smpr*investor_pr    .014** 
   (.002) 
Sec25 -.175** -.166** -.158** 
 (.067) (.067) (.067) 
GDP -.167 -.308 -.338* 
 (.223) (.183) (.183) 
GDP2  .131  .286  .306 
 (.238) (.202) (.197) 
R2  .496  .641  .646 
Obs.   43   42   42 
The dependent variable is the average Gini coefficient between 1980 and 
2000. Real per capita GDP and education (sec25 and gh_15) are in initial 
values, smpr is in sample averages. All regressions include a dummy for 
Latin American countries. Coefficients are estimated with Ordinary Least 
Squares. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis, 5 and 10 per cent 
significant coefficients are marked with ** and *, respectively. 
 
Table 3. Investor protection, risk-sharing market and income inequality 
IV - cross-section - 1980-2000 
Panel A. First Step – Dependent variable: smpr 
 1 2 3 
 Whole sample Smpr<1.5 Whole sample 
Sec25  .031  .246 -.293 
 (.598) (.313) (.471) 
GDP  .212  .579 1.299 
 (1.016) (.545) (.941) 
GDP2 -.298 -.539 -1.597 
 (1.093) (.585) (1.039) 
Investor_pr    .097** 
   (.024) 
Eff_jud    .047 
   (.040) 
UK legal origin  .588**  .419**  
 (.242) (.128)  
FR legal origin  .135  .126  
 (.269) (.141)  
GE legal origin  .017 -.053  
 (.339) (.177)  
R2  .183  .302  .386 
Obs.   68   65   42 
Panel B. Second Step – Dependent variable: Gini 
 1 2 3 
 Whole sample Smpr<1.5 Whole sample 
smpr  .109**  .136**  .077** 
 (.042) (.047) (.038) 
Sec25 -.176** -.201** -.163** 
 (.077) (.060) (.067) 
GDP -.082 -.224* -.275* 
 (.143) (.114) (.152) 
GDP2  .102  .233*  .246 
 (.155) (.123) (.173) 
Sargan (p-value)  .345  .149  .369 
F-test  3.98  7.08  9.44 
(p-value)  .012  .000  .000 
Panel A. The dependent variable is average smpr between 1980 and 2000. 
Real per capita GDP and education (sec25 and gh_15) are in initial values, 
investor protection and efficiency of the judiciary are averages.  
Panel B. The dependent variable is the average Gini coefficient between 1980 
and 2000. Real per capita GDP and education (sec25 and gh_15) are in initial 
values, smpr is in sample averages. Both p-values and statistics are reported 
for the F-test of the excluded instruments. Only p-values are reported for the 
Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions. 
All regressions include a dummy for Latin American countries. Coefficients 
are estimated with Two-Stages Least Squares. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parenthesis, 5 and 10 per cent significant coefficients are marked 
with ** and *, respectively. 
Table 4. Risk-sharing market and income inequality 
Sensitivity analysis - cross-section - 1980-2000 
 OLS IV – legal origins OLS 
 Latest Gini 
Average smpr 
Latest Gini 
Average smpr 
Average Gini 
smpr(1985) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 Whole 
sample 
Whole 
sample 
Whole 
sample 
smpr 
<1.5 
Whole 
sample 
Whole 
sample 
Smpr  .032  .136**  .109**  .131**  .087**  .040 
 (.031) (.035) (.046) (.051) (.032) (.063) 
Smpr2  -.034**     .0003 
  (.009)    (.0004) 
R2  .469  .543  .265  .541  .633  .639 
F-Test 
(p-value) 
  3.900 
(.013) 
7.600 
(.000) 
  
Sargan  
(p-value) 
  1.786 
(.409) 
3.202 
(.202) 
  
Obs.   65   65   65   62   40   40 
In columns 1-4 the dependent variable is the latest available observation of 
Gini coefficient after 1985, smpr is 1980-2000 average. Initial (1980) values of 
real per capita GDP and sec25 plus a dummy for Latin America are included. 
In columns 5-6 the dependent variable is the 1985-2000 average of Gini, smpr 
is observed in 1985. Initial (1985) values of real per capita GDP and sec25 
plus a dummy for Latin America are included. Coefficients in columns 1-2 and 
5-6 are estimated with Ordinary Least Squares. Coefficients in columns 3-4 are 
second step estimates from 2SLS regressions, with legal origins as instruments 
for smpr; first step estimates are not reported but available from the author. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis, 5 and 10 per cent significant 
coefficients are marked with ** and *, respectively. 
 
Table 5. Risk-sharing market and income inequality 
Robustness analysis - cross-section - 1980-2000 
 OLS IV – legal origins  
 1 2 3 4 
 Whole 
sample 
Whole 
sample 
Whole 
sample 
smpr <1.5 
Smpr  .039  .158**  .122**  .165** 
 (.032) (.037) (.049) (.058) 
Smpr2  -.037**   
  (.009)   
Gov -.0006 -.001 -.002 -.0015 
 (.0008) (.0008) (.002) (.0011) 
Trade  .00001 -.0002 -.0002 -.0003 
 (.0001) (.0002) (.0003) (.0003) 
Sec25 -.186** -.207** -.185** -.220** 
 (.057) (.054) (.082) (.063) 
GDP -.111 -.140 -.069 -.182 
 (.136) (.120) (.162) (.125) 
GDP2  .122  .139  .081  .184 
 (.138) (.124) (.172) (.133) 
R2  .502  .592  .264  .571 
F-Test 
(p-value) 
  3.18 
(.030) 
5.45 
(.002) 
Sargan 
(p-value) 
  2.231 
(.328) 
3.942 
(.139) 
Obs. 68   68   68   65 
The dependent variable is the average Gini coefficient 
between 1980 and 2000. Real per capita GDP and sec25 are 
in initial values, smpr, government expenditure (gov) and 
trade over GDP are in sample averages. All regressions 
include a dummy for Latin American countries. Coefficients 
in columns 1-2 are estimated with Ordinary Least Squares. 
Coefficients in columns 3-4 are second step estimates from 
2SLS regressions, with legal origins as instruments for smpr; 
first step estimates are not reported but available from the 
author. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis, 5 
and 10 per cent significant coefficients are marked with ** 
and *, respectively. 
Table 6. Risk-sharing market and income inequality 
Static Panel – 1976-2000 
 Large sample DPD sample 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 RE FE RE RE RE RE 
Smpr  2.615**  2.88*   3.368**  7.430**  
 (.551) (1.62)  (1.059) (2.389)  
Smpr2  -.023   -1.983*  
  (.259)   (1.036)  
Smcap   17.449**    6.579** 
   (3.886)   (1.760) 
Privo   -5.358**   -3.097 
   (1.899)   (2.472) 
Sec25 -.177** -.149** -.206** -.180** -.198** -.161** 
 (.049) (.068) (.049) (.050) (.050) (.048) 
GDP -12.923* -7.803 -14.892** -9.053 -9.107 -10.417 
 (7.151) (.11.89) (7.196) (7.181) (7.011) (7.439) 
GDP2  10.839**  8.795  9.369**  9.054*  8.875*  8.368* 
 (4.838) (6.443) (4.774) (4.686) (4.651) (4.652) 
Hausman test  .425  .026  .951  .461  .248  .369 
Countries  50 50 50  34  34  34 
Obs. 144 144 144 112 112 112 
The dependent variables is the Gini coefficient. Real per capita GDP, and education (sec25) 
are in initial values, financial variables (smpr, smcap and privo) are in sample averages over 
non-overlapping 5-year periods. All equations were estimated with random (RE) and fixed 
effects (FE). The coefficients are reported from the specification chosen based on the 
Hausman tests, whose p-values are reported in the table. Robust standard errors are reported 
in parenthesis, 5 and 10 per cent significant coefficients are marked with ** and *, 
respectively.  
Table 7. Risk-sharing market and income inequality 
Dynamic Panel Data – System GMM – 1976-2000 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
log(Smpr)  .045**  .041**  .204**  .128*   
 (.021) (.021) (.071) (.068)   
log(Smpr2)   -.119** -.061   
   (.054) (.054)   
log(Smcap)      .106**  .095** 
     (.029) (.034) 
log(Privo)     -.106** -.131** 
     (.041) (.037) 
log(Gini_5)  .369**  .387**  .361**  .441**  .379**  .445** 
 (.151) (.144) (.139) (.132) (.181) (.164) 
log(Sec25) -.081 -.095 -.105 -.069 -.117 -.134 
 (.104) (.083) (.079) (.069) (.095) (.103) 
log(GDP)  .188  .249  .166  .274  .161  .320* 
 (.174) (.170) (.168) (.167) (.158) (.176) 
log(GDP2) -.211 -.280 -.198 -.322 -.146 -.287 
 (.206) (.204) (.189) (.196) (.177) (.187) 
Sargan (p-value)  .387  .506  .793  .776  .508  .647 
m2 (p-value)  .527  .870  .383  .822  .346  .481 
Time FE 
(F-Test) 
 No  Yes 
(.153) 
 No  Yes 
(.293) 
 No  Yes 
(.123) 
Countries  32  32  32  32  32  32 
Obs.  84  84  84  84  84  84 
The dependent variables in the system are the log and the log-difference of the Gini 
coefficient. All regressors are in log and log-differences. Real per capita GDP, and 
education (sec25) are in initial values, financial variables (smpr, smcap and privo) are 
in sample averages over non-overlapping 5-year periods. Coefficients are first step 
estimates from 2-step system GMM regressions à la Arellano and Bover, performed 
with PcGive. All regressors are treated as endogenous (Gini) or predetermined, hence 
instrumented. Lagged levels are used as instruments for differences, and lagged 
differences as instruments for levels. Robust (first step) standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis, 5 and 10 per cent significant coefficients are marked with ** and *, 
respectively. P-values for the Sargan and m2 tests are reported from the second step. 
Table 8. Risk-sharing market and income inequality 
Robustness analysis – Panel – 1976-2000 
 Static Panel – RE  Dynamic Panel – System GMM 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Smpr 2.858**  6.683**  .047**  .168**  .057**  .189** 
 (1.139) (2.411) (.020) (.068) (.022) (.069) 
Smpr2  -1.865*  -.093*  -.099* 
  (1.031)  (.051)  (.053) 
Gov   .066  .059 -.009 -.004   
 (.089) (.087) (.087) (.077)   
Trade   .024  .022   -.028 -.034* 
 (.017) (.016)   (.024) (.019) 
Gini_5    .347**  .367**  .390**  400** 
   (.149) (.133) (.143) (.140) 
Sec25 -.174** -.189** -.088 -.092 -.139** -.163** 
 (.050) (.050) (.072) (.071) (.064) (.067) 
GDP -10.074 -10.070  .189  .196  .219  .169 
 (7.363) (7.214) (.171) (.166) (.168) (.143) 
GDP2  9.576**  9.353** -.211 -.232 -.214 -.169 
 (4.667) (4.636) (.196) (.183) (.194) (.171) 
Hausman  .325  .118     
Sargan (p-value)    .584  .896  .808  .967 
m2 (p-value)    .504  .393  .414  .386 
Countries 34 34  32  32  32  32 
Obs. 112 112  84  84  84  84 
The dependent variable is the 5-year average Gini coefficient. Real per capita GDP 
and sec25 are in initial values, smpr, government expenditure (gov) and trade over 
GDP are in 5-year averages. All regressions include a dummy for Latin American 
countries. All variables are in levels in columns 1-2, in logs and log-differences in 
columns 3-6. Coefficients in columns 1-2 are estimated with random effects (preferred 
to fixed effects on the basis of the Hausman test). Coefficients in columns 3-4 are first 
step estimates from 2-step system GMM regressions à la Arellano and Bover, 
performed with PcGive. All regressors are treated as endogenous (Gini) or 
predetermined, hence instrumented. Lagged levels are used as instruments for 
differences and lagged differences as instruments for levels. Robust standard errors 
(from the first step, in columns 3-6) are reported in parenthesis, 5 and 10 per cent 
significant coefficients are marked with ** and *, respectively. P-values for the Sargan 
and m2 tests are reported from the second step. 
 
